产业前沿讲座2018年第7期(总第59期):显微镜之下:董事会透明度与董事监控行为的实验考察

发布者:朱汉彬发布时间:2018-05-22浏览次数:247

主  题:UNDER THE MICROSCOPE: AN EXPERIMENTAL LOOK AT BOARD TRANSPARENCY AND DIRECTOR MONITORING BEHAVIOR
显微镜之下:董事会透明度与董事监控行为的实验考察
主讲嘉宾:李炜文  副教授、博导
主 持 人:石军伟 教授
时  间:2018年5月25日(周五)9:00—11:00
地  点:文泉北307会议室
主办单位:工商管理系、现代产业经济研究中心
  
嘉宾简介:中山大学管理学院副教授,主要研究方向包括公司治理、家族企业、以及国际创业。其研究论文被Strategic Management Journal, Journal of International Business Studies,Journal of World Business, Global Strategy Journal等国际期刊发表。他曾获得中国管理研究国际学会(IACMR)最佳宏观论文奖。他是Asia Pacific Journal of Management,Management and Organization Review编委会成员。
 
内容简介:In most advanced economies, the board’s internal decision processes are either undisclosed or disclosed only to a very limited extent. It remains unknown, then, whether directors would behave differently if their behaviors were made public. We find that when their actions are disclosed to the public, directors concerned with their public reputations become more vigilant, whereas those concerned with their prospects for additional board seats become more passive in monitoring corporate insiders. Whereas regulatory bodies and corporate governance watchdogs have recently advocated for greater disclosure of the boardroom decision making process, our study suggests that such mandatory disclosure requirements can exacerbate, rather than alleviate, the problem of passive director monitoring.